






























THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM 























João M. Pinto* 
Professor of Finance 
School of Economics and Management 










First Draft: January 2014 
Current Draft: April 2014 
Comments Welcome 









* The author thanks Álvaro Nascimento, Jorge Alcover, Mário Santos, Manuel 
Marques, Miguel Ferreira, and William Megginson for helpful comments on earlier 
drafts. A special word of appreciation is due to Goldman Sachs for providing access to 





Please address all correspondence to: 
João M. Pinto 
Católica Porto Business School 
Rua Diogo Botelho, 1327 
4169-005 PORTO 





Securitization is the process whereby financial assets are pooled together, with their cash flows, 
and sold to a specially created third party that has borrowed money to finance the purchase. The 
borrowed funds are raised through the sale of securities, in the form of debt instruments, into the 
market. Securitization is thus a technique used to transform illiquid assets into securities. 
Securitization creates value by increasing liquidity and funding, reducing the cost of funding, 
allowing originators to reach a funding sources diversification, improving originators’ risk 
management, increasing the segmentation between the origination and investment functions, 
and allowing originators to benefit from regulatory (and/or tax) arbitrage and to improve key 
financial ratios. 
Although the economic advantages, securitization also has problems, especially when used 
inappropriately. Considering the important role played by securitization in the development and 
propagation of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the most commonly referred problems of 
securitization are complexity, off-balance sheet treatment, asymmetric information problems, 
agency problems, and higher transaction costs. 
Besides describing the economic motivations and problems of securitization, this paper provides 
details on asset securitization characteristics and players, presents the recent trends of 
securitization markets, describes the role played by securitization in the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis, and provides some statistics of asset securitization activity in Western Europe between 
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1. Introduction 
The global development of the corporate sector has been demanding the creation of new 
vehicles for fundraising. Professionalization and the growing sophistication of capital markets, 
as well as increasing access to international markets, require less risky securities and 
internationally standardized warrantees. Therefore, analysis has been increasingly focused on a 
risk assessment process based on asset segregation and asset pooling, rather than on a company 
or a group of companies looking for financing. For many countries, this has required 
adjustments to be made to their financial system, towards new forms of financing, in which the 
role of securitization transactions has gained increasing relevance.  
Securitization means a process by which an entity pools together its interest in 
identifiable future cash flows, transfers the claims on those future cash flows to another entity 
that is specifically created for the sole purpose of holding those financial claims, and then issue 
negotiable securities to be placed into the market. Thus, the aim of securitization is to transform 
illiquid assets into securities suitable for trade. 
The interest of studying securitization is also justified by its dramatic increase in the last 
decade and by recent events in financial markets. The financial turmoil started in the third 
quarter of 2007 and continued through to 2008, leading to concerns about the exposure of 
financial institutions to the most risky segments of the US mortgage markets – the so-called 
subprime mortgage market – and related financial instruments. The resulting financial market 
tensions caused investors and regulators to be concerned about (and even doubt) the impact of 
some types of securitization transactions on financial stability during times of stress, and the 
ability of different securitization products to spread shocks across different capital segments. As 
a result, there is an increased need to understand what securitization transactions are, the 
motivations behind them, their benefits, features and even their problems. 
To understand why securitization matters, we are taken back to the Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) capital structure irrelevance theorem, which holds that capital structure is 
irrelevant to firm value. In a Modigliani and Miller world, securitization transactions would not 
exist, as they would offer no advantages over less costly alternatives. However, considering that 
debt and equity of any firm effectively represent asset-backed securities, the irrelevance 
proposition can play a fundamental role within a securitization framework. In a world of perfect 
and liquid financial markets, where asymmetric information is not an issue, tranching or the act 
of encapsulating an initiative or a pool of assets in an ad hoc organization would not add value 
and firm’s financing structure would be irrelevant. Thus, the existence of market imperfections 
(at least asymmetric information, market incompleteness, and market segmentation) can explain 
tranching, ‘off-balance sheet financing’ and the benefits of securitization instruments. 
Consequently, securitization may matter, because it creates value by minimizing the net costs 
associated with the stated market imperfections. 
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Despite the previously mentioned economic benefits for sponsors and investors, 
securitization transactions also have disadvantages, especially when used inappropriately. One 
can identify the following problems related to the use of securitization: (i) complexity; (ii) off-
balance sheet treatment; (iii) asymmetric information problems; (iv) agency problems; and (v) 
higher transaction costs. Besides the fact that securitization instruments are complex vis-a-vis 
straight debt finance transactions or products, two major problems are commonly pointed out, 
underlying the roots of the 2007/2008 financial crisis: (i) asymmetric information problems; and 
(ii) agency problems. The increased complexity of structured products related to securitization – 
like CDOs, squared CDOs, and even more complex securities – destroyed information, thereby 
making asymmetric information worse in the financial system and increasing the severity of 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. The originate-to-distribute business model, which 
lay behind the subprime mortgage market, was subject to the principal-agent problem, because 
(i) the mortgage originator had little incentive to make sure that the mortgage was of good credit 
risk, (ii) commercial and investment banks had weak incentives to ensure that the ultimate 
holders of the securities would be duly paid for, and (iii) even the credit rating agencies 
evaluating these securities were themselves also subjected to conflict of interest. 
In this paper we will be taking a close look at securitization financing deals. As there 
are so many different deals, spanning across many different asset classes as well as 
jurisdictions, we will look to the prominent classes of securitization transactions. The main 
objective of this paper is to analyze the basic characteristics and market structure of 
securitization activity and to answer the following questions: (i) What is securitization?; (ii) 
How is the transaction structured?; (iii) What is the role of each party involved in the 
securitization process?; (iv) What are the economic motivations and problems of securitization?; 
(v) What are the major tax, accounting, and legal issues?; (vi) What was the role played by 
securitization in the 2007/2008 financial crisis; and (vii) How has the Western European market 
for securitization changed after the 2007/2008 financial crisis? 
2. Definition of Securitization 
Generally speaking, the term securitization is used to represent the process whereby 
financial assets are pooled together, with their cash flows, and converted into negotiable 
securities to be placed into the market; i.e., it is a technique used to transform illiquid assets into 
securities. As asserted by Roever and Fabozzi (2003) “… securitization is a form of financing 
where monetary assets with predictable cash flows are pooled and sold to a specially created 
third party that has borrowed money to finance the purchase. These borrowed funds are raised 
through the sale of asset-backed securities (ABS), which can take the form of either commercial 
paper or bonds”. Similarly, Fabozzi et al. (2006) point out that securitization “… refers to the 
sale of assets, which generate cash flows, from the entity that owns them to another entity that 
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has been specially set up for the purpose, and the issuing of notes by this second entity. These 
notes […] are referred to as asset-backed securities.”
1
 Securitization is thus a structured finance 
technique allowing for credit to be provided directly through market processes rather than 
through financial intermediaries – the so-called financial disintermediation.
2
 
The key element of securitization is that the obligation of the issuer to repay investors is 
backed by the value of a pool of financial assets or credit support provided by a third party to 
the transaction. Contrary to the traditional secured bonds, where it is the ability of the originator 
(or issuer) to generate sufficient cash flows to reimburse the debt that determines the risks of the 
transaction, in securitization the source of repayments/funds shifts from the cash flows of the 
issuer to the cash flows generated by the securitized assets and/or a third party that guarantees 
the payments whenever cash flows become insufficient. This idea is corroborated by Vink and 
Thibeault (2008), which point out that the essential “… element of an asset securitization issue 
is the fact that repayment depends only or primarily on the assets and cash flows pledged as 
collateral to the issue, and not on the overall financial strengths of the originator (sponsor or 
parent company).” Therefore, before performing a transaction it is essential to evaluate the 
assets’ characteristics, because they will affect (i) the creditworthiness of the related securities – 
represented by a rating assigned by a rating agency; and (ii) the type and magnitude of credit 
enhancement mechanisms necessary to improve the rating of the securities issued. 
The markets for the securities issued through securitization are composed of three main 
classes [Blum and DiAngelo (1997) and Choudhry and Fabozzi (2004)]: asset-backed securities 
(ABS), mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
Securities backed by mortgages are called MBS, securities backed by debt obligations are called 
CDOs, and securities backed by consumer-backed products – e.g., car loans, consumer loans, 
and credit cards – are called ABS. 
Securitization securities are issued as subordinated, negotiable contingent claims 
(tranches) with varying seniority and maturity, backed by the credit payment performance of 
securitized assets. These tranches represent different risk-return profiles, with the underlying 
reference portfolio to be allocated among the various tranches through prioritized contractual 
repartitioning. It can be presented the following issuers of asset-backed securities: (i) captive 
finance companies of manufacturing firms that provide financing only for their parent 
company’s products; (ii) financing subsidiaries of major industrial corporations; (iii) 
independent finance companies; and (iv) domestic and foreign commercial banks. With regard 
to banks, securitization technique allows the transformation of heterogeneous assets that are 
                                                 
1
 See, among others, Davidson et al. (2003), Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Tavakoli (2003, 2008), Tasca 
and Zambelli (2005), Kothari (2006), Jobst (2007), and Krebsz (2011) who explain the structure of 
securitization transactions. 
2
 See, among others, Caselli and Gatti (2005), Davis (2005), Akbiyikli et al. (2006), and Fabozzi et al. 
(2006) for further discussion of structured finance. 
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mostly not negotiable into liquid and homogenous securities, suitable for trade. The range of 
assets that can be securitized by banks is very wide and includes mortgage loans, credit card 
receivables, bonds, auto loans, and loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, among others. 
3. The Typical Securitization Transaction Scheme 
As pointed out, a securitization transaction is implemented through a transfer of assets 
from the originator to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or a Special Purpose Entity (SPE), 
which then issues securities, in the form of debt instruments, to be placed into the market 
through a private or public offering. Exhibit 1 presents a graphic representation of the fund 
flows in a typical securitization transaction. As shown, there are two basic deals involved: (i) 
the asset sale; and (ii) the issuance of securities (considering ABS in this case). For example, if 
a bank intends to raise money by selling a specific pool of loans through securitization, it is 
possible to identify the subsequent fund flows during the life of a securitization transaction: (i) 
the bank (originator) sells the assets to a separate entity (SPV); (ii) the SPV transforms them 
into negotiable securities to be placed into the capital market; (iii) the issuance of securities 
(usually debt obligation instruments) – backed by the acquired assets – in order to finance the 
asset purchase; and (iv) the cash flows originated by the acquired pool of assets are then used to 











Exhibit 1: Fund flows in a securitization transaction. 
Source: Adapted from Roever and Fabozzi (2003) and Tasca and Zambelli (2005). 
 
The standard structure for securitization in Europe is somewhat different from the 
United States (U.S.) [Davidson et al. (2003)]. In the U.S. trusts play an important role. They 
own assets such mortgage loans and investors have a direct ownership interest in the trust. In 
Europe, all deals use a variant of the following structure: (i) the originator sells the assets to an 
SPV; and (ii) the SPV then issues a bond, which is purchased by various investors, backed by 
the assets owned by the SPV. This vehicle company is usually a company subject to corporate 
                                                 
3
 The cash collection related to the securitized portfolio is managed by the Servicer (the originator or a 
third party), which receives a servicing fee. Servicing involves collecting cash from borrowers, notifying 
borrowers who may fail, and, when necessary, recovering and disposing of the collateral if the borrower 

































law, but restricted in activity, and may be exempted from certain taxes.
4
 But in Europe, as in 
any other part of the world, the securitization process involves a standard set of analysis prior to 
the issuance of securities, namely: (i) assessing the collateral; (ii) modeling cash flows; (iii) 
quantify risk factors via stress tests or other techniques; and (iv) structuring the transaction – 
having in mind several factors, such as the client’s wishes, the type of assets, the opinion of the 
rating agencies, the availability of data, and the investor attraction for the deal.
5
 
In order to understand the whole securitization process, Exhibit 2 describes the major 















Exhibit 2: Basic securitization process. 
Source: The author. 
 
 
Next we describe the major steps usually presented in a securitization transaction. Step 
1: the originator identifies a pool of assets (receivables) that satisfy certain features that make 
them acceptable to be securitized;
6
 Step 2: the pool of assets is transferred to an SPV at par 
                                                 
4
 As asserted by Davidson et al. (2003), this type of structure “… can be much more costly than a U.S. 
trust company because in continental Europe it is very common to have a minimum amount of share 
capital necessary to set up a company.” For example, in Belgium, the minimum is 62 Euro thousands, in 
the Netherlands 20 Euro thousands, and in Portugal 250 Euro thousands (applied to ‘Sociedades de 
Titularização de Créditos’). The U.K. tends to be the most popular jurisdictions for SPVs, as well as 
Ireland, because there is no minimum share capital necessary. 
5
 Structuring the transaction requires to deal with the following issues: (i) timing; (ii) risk; (iii) credit 
enhancement and rating; (iv) legal process and counterparties – collateral arrangements, counterparty 
arrangements, bond description, legal opinions, and rating letters –; and (v) costs. 
6
 The originator typically identifies assets with similar characteristics. Theoretically, any asset producing 
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value and based on a true sale transaction;
7
 Step 3: the SPV holds the asset pool, paying for it by 
issuing securities;
8
 Step 4: securities are offered to capital markets and structured into different 
classes;
9
 Step 5: payment of the asset purchase; and Step 6: the originator – who has proximity 
with the borrowers and typically has an infrastructure and systems in place for doing so – 
collects cash flows related to the assets (interest and principal); i.e., retains the servicing 
function. 
The highest rating for Class A (the most senior class) is explained by two factors: (i) the 
assets’ segregation from bankruptcy risks of the originator; and (ii) the implementation of 
different credit enhancement strategies. One strategy is the creation of a credit risk mitigation 
device by subordination of Classes B, C, D, …, such that those lower classes provide credit 
support to Class A. It is possible to say that the size of classes B and C is determined as to meet 
the rating objective for Class A. Likewise, the size of Class C is determined as to have Class B 
accorded the desired rating. In other words, the entire transaction is structured to meet specific 
investor needs. That’s why, in a narrow sense, the term structured finance is used almost 
interchangeably with securitization. 
Different credit enhancement mechanisms may be necessary to improve the credit rating 
of the issued securities and reduce the risks transferred to investors; i.e., credit enhancement 
serves to protect investors from the risk of collateral not being repaid as expected.
10
 These 
mechanisms can be either internally determined within the transaction structure – internal credit 
enhancement mechanisms – or externally provided by a third party – external credit 
enhancement mechanisms. The issuer should examine the various mechanisms of credit 
enhancement prior to issuance, to determine the most effective combination. As referred by 
Fabozzi et al. (2006), “… the reason why an issuer does not simply seek a triple-A rating for all 
the securities in the structure is that there is a cost to doing so […] In general the issuer, in 
deciding to improve the credit rating on some securities in a structure, will evaluate the tradeoff 
associated with the cost of enhancement versus the reduction in yield required to sell the 
security.” 
                                                 
7
 True sale or mutually exclusive use of asset pool’s cash flows means that the originator would not have 
any direct claim on the receivables, nor would the investors in the securities issued by the SPC or the SPV 
itself have any claim against the general assets of the originator. 
8
 To finance the acquisition of the assets, the SPV issues securities sold to investors. The credit rating of 
those securities will be based solely on the strength of the asset pool. The issued securities may be senior 
and junior, or they may be senior, mezzanine, and junior, or they may have various classes, such as class 
A, class B, class C, and so on. These various classes are created in order to generate differential interests 
in the pool, such that the senior investors have superior rights over the pool than the subordinated 
investors. 
9
 The SPV sells securities in the capital markets through a private placement or public offering, with the 
help of underwriters. These securities are usually purchased by banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds and other institutional investors. 
10
 See, for example, Roever and Fabozzi (2003) and Fabozzi and Kothari (2007) for an in depth 
description of internal and external credit enhancement mechanisms. 
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External credit enhancement mechanisms are provided by third-party guarantees, 
granting for first-loss protection against losses up to certain amount. Examples are: (i) 
guarantees; (ii) letters of credit;
11
 and (iii) bond insurance.
12
 This kind of guarantee can either 
apply to all the issued tranches or, more typically, only to one particular tranche. Internal credit 




 (iii) cash reserve 
accounts;
15
 (iv) excess spread;
16
 (v) trigger events; and (vi) minimum debt or interest service 
coverage levels. The type and amount of credit enhancement employed in a transaction 
represents the matching point of the issuer’s need to maximize deal proceeds and the rating 
agencies’ judgment with respect to how much credit enhancement is required to achieve the 
desired rating on the senior bond classes. One important difference between the approach used 
to rate securitized debt and bonds is that corporate obligations are rated ex post while securitized 
products are rated ex ante. Securitization transactions are thus structured with the idea of issuing 
securities that meet a specific rating profile [Roever and Fabozzi (2003)]. 
A central and defining characteristic of securitization is that the cash flows generated by 
a company’s financial assets can support one or more securities that may be of higher credit 
quality then the company’s secured debt. To achieve this higher credit quality, the securities 
used to fund the securitization rely on the cash flow created by the assets – or guarantee by a 
third party – rather than on the payment promise of the company. Regarding the securitization 
financing structure, there are two essential characteristics to be highlighted. The first concerns 
to the SPV, which represents a critical player within the process. Secondly, the transaction is 
realized through a ‘true sale’ of assets by the originator to the SPV. The ‘true sale’ mechanism 
allows a company to isolate a group of financial assets, separating their risk from the firm.
17
 
Therefore, the expected return to investors relies mainly on the risk of the cash flows guaranteed 
                                                 
11
 It is a financial guarantee through which a bank becomes committed to reimburse credit losses up to a 
predetermined amount. 
12
 Also called a surety bond, a bond insurance is a financial guarantee from an insurance company, 
commonly called monoline insurance company [e.g., Ambac Assurance Corporation (AMBAC); 
Financial Guaranty Insurance Corporation (FGIC); Financial Security Assurance (FSA); Municipal Bond 
Insurance Corporation (MBIA); and XL Capital Assurance]. The guarantee provided is for the timely 
payments of principal and interest if these payments cannot be satisfied from the cash flow from the 
underlying loan pool. 
13
 Issuers can increase their advance rates by selling additional bonds of lesser credit quality, which are 
subordinated in payment priority to the senior bonds issued from the structuring. Subordinated tranches 
will absorb collateral losses for the benefit of senior bonds. 
14
 The overlying bonds are lower in value compared to the underlying asset pool: for example, 250 Euro 
millions nominal of assets are used as backing for 200 Euro millions nominal of issued bonds. 
15
 Usually from part of the debt proceeds, a cash reserve is maintained in a account and used to cover 
initial losses. 
16
 The excess spread results from the positive difference between cash inflows from assets and the interest 
service requirements of liabilities. It acts as the first line of credit support for the deal and if losses are 
low, the excess spread will increase. 
17
 Contrary to the U.S., in Europe, in many jurisdiction (e.g., Germanic type of law), there is a sale or 
assignment of the assets to an SPV but the perfection of the sale is often postpone until various trigger 
events occur in order to avoid complicated borrower notification laws. See Davidson et al. (2003) for 
further discussion of European securitization legislation. 
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by the pool of assets, rather than the default risk of the originator. The SPV role is critical and 
provides an investor with greater protection. With the separate incorporation of the SPV – 
which is intended to isolate the assets – the assets are no longer available to the originator or its 
creditors.
18
 Furthermore, the SPV activity is strictly limited to holding the asset pool and issue 
in turn securities backed by these assets; i.e., the SPV is not allowed to perform other business 
activities and to assume other obligations. 
Financial intermediaries play a crucial role within the securitization process, which 
includes the following activities: (i) identification of homogeneous financial assets to be 
securitized; (ii) identification, together with the credit agency (or credit agencies when 
necessary), of the financial structure of the securities; (iii) if the credit rating analysis is positive, 
the arranger writes a pre-sale report (and external auditors implement a due diligence of the 
asset portfolio); (iv) in line with legal firms, the legal contracts are developed (e.g., transfer 
agreement, indemnity and warranty agreement, corporate services agreement, servicing 
agreement, cash management agreement and collateral management agreement, trust deed, deed 
of pledge, and subscription agreement); (v) planning of marketing activities, including a road 
show aimed at presenting the transaction characteristics to institutional investors; and (vi) 
issuance and placement of the securities in the primary market.
19
 The next phase in the process 
is the acquisition of the securities by investors.
20
 
4. Securitization Structures 
Securitization can be implemented basically in two ways: (i) in a so-called true sale 
securitization, the underlying assets are sold by the originator (a firm or more specifically a 
bank) to the SPV and thus removed from its balance sheet; (ii) in a so-called synthetic 
securitization, the underlying assets remain on the balance sheet of the originator, and only risk 
of the underlying assets is transferred to the SPV by buying credit derivatives such as credit 
default swaps over these assets [ECB (2008)]. Similarly, Tasca and Zambelli (2005) split 
securitization transactions into two main types: (i) cash flow based (CFB) securitization or 
funded securitization – structured as a sale of assets by a company (originator) to a special entity 
(SPV), which then issues securities backed by the underlying assets; and (ii) synthetic 
                                                 
18
 Although the remoteness from bankruptcy may be achieved ensuring independence of the SPV from 
the originator, in practice this has been thrown somewhat into doubt during the credit crisis as the true 
sale status has been challenged in some federal courts in the U.S. Originators need to ensure carefully that 
the assets transferred to the SPV are ring-fenced from further originator interaction and have to analyze 
cautiously if any structural feature of the transaction may threaten the true sale claim. 
19
 Usually a offering circular has to be design to provide information to investors. The underwriter works 
together with the SPV to place securities in the primary market and usually ensures to the originator the 
acquisition of those securities that may remain unsold. 
20
 It is important to notice that interest rate derivatives play an important role in securitization transactions 
for hedging and yield enhancement. The most commonly used interest rate derivatives are interest rate 
swaps, interest rate caps, and interest rate corridors. See, e.g., Fabozzi et al. (2005) for further discussion 
of this subject. 
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securitization – structured in such a way that the credit risk associated with a pool of assets is 
transferred to a separated entity (SPV). As in synthetic securitization there is no sale of assets, 
the originator does not receive any cash flow and the SPV is not the owner of the pool of assets, 
but rather the entity carrying the associated credit risk. This is realized through the use of 
derivatives like total return swaps and credit derivatives – the most widely used credit derivative 
is the credit default swap (CDS). 
Exhibit 3 provides an overview of the main securitization instruments. Funded 
securitizations include three main categories: (i) Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS); (ii) Asset-
Backed Securities (ABS); and (iii) cash flow Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs).
21
 In 
practice, CDOs can be classified either as funded securitization, synthetic securitization or a 
hybrid form incorporating elements of both. In this paper, a cash flow CDO is a form of a 
funded securitization and a synthetic CDO a form of a synthetic securitization, since synthetic 




















Exhibit 3: Securitization instruments. 
Source: Adapted from Criado and Rixtel (2008). 
                                                 
21
 See, among others, Jobst (2003, 2006b) and Vink and Thibeault (2008) for further discussion of this 































































Given the important role played by CDOs in the 2007/2008 financial turmoil, we 
carried out a more detailed analysis of such structures.
22
 CDOs, first introduced in 1988, are a 
type of securitization in which an SPV issues bonds or notes backed by cash flows of an 
underlying pool of assets. These assets include one or more of the following types of debt 
obligations [Fabozzi et al. (2006)]: (i) investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds; (ii) 
emerging market bonds; (iii) residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS); (iv) commercial 
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS); (v) asset-backed securities (ABS); (vi) real estate 
investment trusts (REIT) debt; (vii) bank loans; (viii) special-situation loans and distressed debt; 
(ix) and other CDOs.”
23
 
As for ABS and RMBS, CDOs can also be divided into two main types: (1) cash flow 
CDOs – backed by a pool of cash-market debt instruments; and (2) synthetic CDOs – investors 
have economic exposures to a pool of debt instruments, but this exposure occurs via a credit 
derivative rather than the purchase of the cash-market instruments. Cash flow CDOs are 
designed to split the credit risk of the underlying pool of assets into various tranches, each of 
which with a different credit exposure from the other. Thus, the notes issued have different risk 
profiles as a result of their relative subordination – that is, the notes are structured in a 
descending order of seniority – and the utilization of additional credit enhancement 
mechanisms. 
Contrary to cash flow CDOs deals, synthetic CDOs are ‘engineering’ so that the credit 
risk of the assets is transferred synthetically – rather than by a true sale – by the sponsor to 
investors, by means of credit derivatives. Using this approach, underlying or reference assets are 
not necessarily moved off the originator’s balance sheet, so it is adopted whenever the primary 
objective is to achieve risk transfer rather than balance sheet funding.
24
 
A specific type of CDOs are Multisector CDOs, also known as ABS CDOs, ABS of 
ABS, CDOs squared (CDOs
2
), or CDOs cubed (CDOs
3
). Multisector CDOs emerged in 1999 as 
a response to investors’ desire to securitize their own positions of structured product, with the 
implementation of both balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet arbitrage deals. These products 
were used and misused in a way that complexity masked the risk. For example, in a Multisector 
CDO including subprime collateral, one can find subprime mortgage loans, subprime auto 
loans, credit card receivables, and mezzanine corporate loans backing mezzanine tranches of 
CDOs used as collateral in a CDOs
2
. Thus, as pointed out by Tavakoli (2008), “[T]hese deals 
are nearly impossible for sophisticated investors to fairly value…” 
                                                 
22
 For further discussion of the causes and consequences of the 2007/2008 financial turmoil see section 6. 
23
 When the underlying pool of debt obligations consists of bond-type instruments is referred as 
collateralized bond obligation (CBO). When the underlying pool of debt obligations is a bank loan, a 
CDO is referred to as a collateralized loan obligation (CLO). 
24
 See, among others, Fabozzi et al. (2006), Lancaster et al. (2008), and Tavakoli (2008) for further 
discussion of CDOs’ deals, namely on the difference between cash flow structures and synthetic 
securitization vehicles. 
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5. The Economic Motivations and Problems of Securitization 
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) capital structure irrelevance theorem holds that 
capital structure is irrelevant to firm value. Financial transactions, such as securitization, would 
not exist as it would offer no advantages over less costly alternatives. Considering that in the 
real world there are a plethora of different capital structures and securitization has been one of 
the principal means by which firms create their capital structures, securitization largely affects 
the value of the firm. 
According to Hill (1996) securitization can help to reduce real-world costs, like 
regulatory costs and information costs. Information costs reduction seems largest for firms who 
face severe ‘lemons problems’ [Akerlof (1970)] – available information about such firms is 
limited, unfavorable, or particularly difficult to appraise. Hill (1996) points out that 
securitization offers a low cost and credible way for information about the firm’s receivables to 
be produced and provided to investors.
25
 Similarly, Iacobucci and Winter (2005) argue that “… 
asset securitization is driven by the propensity of the market to allocate assets to investors who 
are best informed about asset values.” 
The rationale for the emergence of securitization transactions should be found in the 
economic advantages of: (i) increased liquidity and funding [e.g., Roever and Fabozzi (2003), 
Jobst (2006a), and Krebsz (2011)]
26
; (ii) reduction of the cost of funding [e.g., Goldberg and 
Rogers (1988), Davidson et al. (2003), Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Fabozzi et al. (2006), Jost 
(2006a), and Fabozzi and Kothari (2007)];
27
 (iii) allowing originators to reach a funding sources 
diversification [e.g., Davidson et al. (2003), Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Fabozzi and Kothari 
(2007), and Krebsz (2011)]; (iv) improving originators’ risk management [e.g., Cumming 
(1987), Goldberg and Rogers (1988), Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988),
28
 Davidson et al. (2003), 
Jobst (2006a), and Fabozzi and Kothari (2007)]; (v) increasing the segmentation between the 
origination and investment functions [e.g., Davidson et al. (2003)]; (vi) allowing originators to 
benefit from regulatory and/or tax arbitrage [e.g., Cumming (1987), Jones (2000), Davidson et 
                                                 
25
 Additionally, Hill (1996) argues that securitization may increase the future cash inflows of a firm due 
to (i) effects of specialization in receivables’ origination and retention – economies of scope; (ii) agency 
costs reduction; and (iii) regulatory costs reduction. 
26
 Roever and Fabozzi (2003) refer to securitization as a reliable and relatively unconstrained source of 
off-balance sheet financing that mitigates traditional funding constrains and can promote a company’s 
growth. Similarly, Jobst (2006a) points out that securitization “… allows issuers to raise funds and 
improve their liquidity position without increasing their on-balance sheet liabilities and capital base in a 
bid to refinance asset origination or investments…”  
27
 If a corporation wants to raise funds creating another legal entity (SPV) and selling assets to that entity 
who issue bonds backed by those assets, it can achieve a better credit rating for the bonds issued than 
otherwise will be obtained if the company will chose to issue corporate bonds – with enough credit 
enhancement, it can issue a bond with a rating triple A. 
28
 Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988) argue that “… securitization transactions manage these risks [credit, 
interest rate, and prepayment risks] more explicitly, and therefore more efficiently, than does conventional 
lending [… and…] it makes these risks more transparent and it also allocates them far more precisely to 
the players who are best able to absorb them.”  
 14 
al. (2003), and Krebsz (2011)];
29
 and (vii) allowing originators to improve key financial ratios 
[e.g., Goldberg and Rogers (1988), Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), 
and Krebsz (2011)]. 
It is possible to discuss the main motivations for securitization from both the 
perspectives of a nonbank corporation and a bank corporation. According to Fabozzi et al. 
(2006) the principal reasons a nonbank corporation may elect to issue an asset-backed security 
are: (i) to reduce funding costs; (ii) to diversify funding sources; and (iii) to accelerate earnings 
for financial reporting purposes.
30
 Looking to bank corporations, the literature presents the 
following four main motivations: (i) the need for new sources of funding – alternative to raising 
deposits [e.g., Goldberg et al. (1988), Fabozzi et al. (2006), Loutskina and Strahan (2009), and 
Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010)]; (ii) risk management and the transfer of credit risk, to fund 
risky financial assets and minimize financial distress costs [e.g., Goldberg and Rogers (1988), 
Fabozzi et al. (2006), Jobst (2006a), and Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010)];
31
 (iii) the search for 
new profit opportunities, by recognizing accounting gains when the market value of loans 
exceed their book value [e.g., Flannery (1989) and DeMarzo (2005)]; and (iv) the adjustment of 
capital ratios [e.g., Donahoo and Shaffer (1991), Berger and Udell (1993), Berger et al. (1995), 
Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995), Jagtiani et al. (1995), Jones (2000), Calomiris and Mason 
(2004), Ambrose et al. (2005), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. 
Fabozzi et al. (2006) present the benefits of securitization from the perspective of 
investors. Securitization transactions allow investors to diversify sector interest, access different 
risk-rewards profiles, and access sectors that are otherwise not open to them. Thus, the key 
benefit to investors is the ability of securitization to tailor risk-return profiles. This idea is 
corroborated by Jobst (2006a), who states that “[I]nvestors of securitized debt can quickly 
adjust their investment holdings at low transaction costs in response to a change of personal 
risk sensitivity, market sentiment or consumption preferences.” Krebsz (2011) presents 
diversification, additional protection mechanisms, the ability to address different type of 
investors, wider pricing, and rating stability as the main advantages of asset securitization in the 
perspective of investors. 
Although all of the above-mentioned economic advantages, securitization also has 
problems, especially when used inappropriately. Asset securitization transactions are fairly 
                                                 
29
 One of the major economic drivers of a new securitization transaction is Basel II (and ongoing forward 
Basel III). The applicable calculation rules (e.g., standardized approach vs internal ratings-based approach 
vs advanced ratings-based approach) highly influence the regulatory capital charge. 
30
 Similarly, Lupica (1998) presents the following motivations for a nonbank corporation to choose 
securitize its assets: (i) improving liquidity; (ii) increasing diversification of funding sources; (iii) 
lowering the effective interest rate; (iv) improving risk management; and (v) achieving accounting-related 
advantages. 
31
 As pointed out by Jobst (2006a), securitization “… is one operational means of risk management, 
which allows issuers to reallocate, commoditise and transfer different types of risks (e.g., credit risk, 
interest rate risk, liquidity risk or pricing risk) to capital market investors at a fair market price.” 
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complex and involve a significant amount of due diligence, negotiation, and legal activities. As 
asserted by Davidson et al. (2003), “[A] first transaction from an originator can take anywhere 
from 1 to 2 years to complete […] Securitization is quite costly in terms of up-front and ongoing 
fees compared to other types of financing.”
32
 This idea is corroborated by Cardone-Riportella et 
al. (2010), which point out that the disadvantages of securitization include the fixed costs of 
setting up the SPV and a potential reduction in the flow of tax benefits from keeping the assets 
in the balance sheet and financing them with debt. Similarly, Jobst (2006a) presents the 
structural complexity of securitization as the main driver for the major concerns about this type 
of structured finance, which are: (i) high accumulation of interest rate risks; (ii) the potential for 
errors in the rating and pricing of complex security designs; and (iii) the shortcomings of 
analytical models for assessing risks. 
The most commonly referred problems of securitization are: (i) complexity [e.g., 
Davidson et al. (2003), Caselli and Gatti (2005), Fender and Mitchell (2005), Fabozzi et al. 
(2006), and Jobst (2006a)]; (ii) off-balance sheet treatment [e.g., Fabozzi et al. (2006) and 
Rutledge and Raynes (2010)]; (iii) asymmetric information problems [e.g., Gorton (2009), Jobst 
(2009), Lupica (2009), and Krebsz (2011)]; (iv) agency problems [e.g., Alles (2001), Jobst 
(2006a), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Jobst (2009)]; and (v) higher transaction costs [e.g., 
Davidson et al. (2003) and Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010)]. Considering that there is a broad 
consensus that securitization played an important role in the development and propagation of 
the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the referred problems of securitization transactions are essentially 
presented within the context of the recent financial crisis.
33
 
The credit crisis of 2007/2008 has somewhat tarnished the positive image prevailing of 
the positive role played by securitization in dispersing credit risk, thereby enhancing the 
resilience of the financial system to default by borrowers. Linking singular credit facilities to the 
aggregate pricing and valuation discipline of capital markets, securitization was expected to 
help remedy deficiencies in financial markets arising from incomplete capital allocation. But the 
collapse of the securitization market and the ensuing market turbulence have cast serious doubt 
on this economic proposition of unbundling, transforming, and redistributing credit risk via 
securitization instruments. Next, we examine the influence of securitization transactions in the 
development and propagation of the 2007/2008 financial turmoil. 
 
                                                 
32
 According to Davidson et al. (2003) for a 100 Euro millions transaction developed in Europe, “… these 
costs add to the overall financing costs anywhere from about 15 to 50 basis points, assuming a 7-year 
bullet financing.” As these costs are essentially fixed, the larger the transactions, the lower is the impact 
on the final funding level. 
33
 See, among others, BIS (2008), Borio (2008), IMF (2008b), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), 
Brunnermeier (2009), and Mishkin (2010). For further discussion of the role of securitization in the 
2007/2008 financial crisis see section 6. 
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6. Securitization and the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis 
The 2007/2008 financial crisis was triggered by the exposure of financial institutions to 
the subprime mortgage market
34
 and related financial instruments, which were primarily related 
to securitization.
35
 Several authors point out that structured finance, specifically securitization, 
played a significant role in the development and propagation of the financial crisis [e.g., BIS 
(2008), IMF (2008b), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), and Demyanyk 
and Van Hemert (2011)]. As the IMF (2008a) states “… the proliferation of new complex 
structured finance products, markets, and business models exposed the financial system to a 
funding disruption and breakdown in confidence” and that particular products “… exacerbated 
the depth and duration of the crisis by adding uncertainty relating to their valuation as the 
underlying fundamentals deteriorated.” The capability of securitization to repackage risks and 
create ‘secure’ assets from a risky collateral lead to a rapid growth in the issuance of structured 
securities, most of which were perceived by investors as near risk-free financial assets. During 
the financial crisis, it was discovered that these securities were actually far riskier than 
originally perceived by investors and certified by rating agencies. As referred by Gennaioli et al. 
(2010), “[W]hen investors or intermediaries perceive some securities to be safe, they would 
borrow using them as collateral, often with very low haircuts…” But when investors and 
intermediaries realized that these securities were actually risky they would sell them, trying to 
meet their collateral requirements, leading to an additional fragility from fire sales. 
Criado and Rixtel (2008) point out a set of weaknesses related with the use of 
securitization, which were revealed by the financial turmoil, including: (i) banks underestimated 
their exposure to structured finance products and specific ‘off-balance sheet’ vehicles; (ii) 
certain banks retained large exposures to specific securitization instruments, such as CDOs 
without sufficiently understanding their impact on capital and liquidity positions; (iii) banks 
resorted to more volatile funding sources including securitization products;
36
 and (iv) the 
process of securitization may have generated unwelcome incentive problems, considering that 
                                                 
34
 According to Kiff and Mills (2007) subprime mortgages are residential loans that do not conform to the 
criteria for ‘prime’ mortgages and so have a lower expected probability of full repayment, as they are 
made to more ‘risky’ mortgage borrowers. Standard and Poor’s states that borrowers below A (credit 
rating) quality are considered subprime. 
35
 According to Criado and Rixtel (2008) “[A]s risk assessments were adjusted, the financial turmoil 
spilled over to other financial market segments and risky assets – particularly those linked to structured 
finance – were abandoned in favor of ‘safe haven’ instruments such as government debt securities.” As 
pointed out by the authors, financial market turmoil showed the following characteristics: (i) stock prices 
fell; (ii) volatility levels jumped – particularly in the short-term money markets; (iii) interbank money 
market interest rates verified unprecedented rises; (iv) credit spreads increased; and (v) central banks 
injected substantial amounts of liquidity into the markets. The liquidity concerns that dominated the initial 
phase of the financial crisis were accompanied by credit risk concerns and transformed into crises of 
solvency related to major financial institutions when they started to report losses that were actually much 
larger than had been anticipated. 
36
 When securitization markets closed, the funding capability of specific banks decreased – such as 
Northern Rock in the United Kingdom – and they were significantly impaired.  
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banks may not have accurately assessed the credit risk of borrowers, when they put their loans 
off-balance sheet using securitization techniques.  
Two major problems can be pointed out underlying the financial crisis: (i) asymmetric 
information problems, and (ii) agency problems [see, among others, Calomiris (2009)]. 
Although financial engineering has the potential to create securities and products that better 
match investors’ needs, they also have hazards. Several authors [e.g., Alles (2001), Jobst 
(2006a), Jobst (2009), and Mishkin (2010)] argue that securitization may lead to a severe 
principal-agent problem when the originator retains little or no interest in the pool of securitized 
assets. In this case, the originator does not have the same incentive to pay attention to the 
creditworthiness of its customers as would be the case when the assets remains in its balance 
sheet. This idea is corroborated by Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), which assert that “[G]iven the 
ability of lenders to pass along subprime loans into the capital markets via credit enhancement 
[…] lenders have been viewed by critics of securitization as abandoning their responsibility of 
evaluating the creditworthiness of potential borrowers.” 
Referring to asymmetric information, Gorton (2009) argues that an important problem 
is the loss of information when high complex structures are used to implement a securitization 
transaction. In the presence of asymmetric information, originators and issuers might be 
tempted to pursue their own economic incentives, which imposes a substantial agency cost on 
efficient asset securitization. Asymmetric information problems can come from (i) the 
information advantage of the originator with respect to the quality of borrowers and the 
historical performance of individual asset exposures – adverse selection; and (ii) the complex 
security design of securitized assets, which suggests superior information of arrangers about the 
true valuation of issued securities. Jobst (2009) corroborates this idea pointing out that “[T]he 
cause of the crisis can be traced to market failure stemming from conflicts of interest in the 
securitization process and ill-designed mechanisms to mitigate the impact of asymmetric 
information.” Empirically, Downing et al. (2009), based on a data set of MBS issued between 
1991 and 2002, found that informed originators trade lemons in the mortgage market; i.e., the 
assets sold to the SPV are of lower quality compared to assets that are retained on the balance 
sheet. This idea is also corroborated by Titman and Tsyplakov (2010). They show that poorly 
performing originators are more willing to originate riskier mortgages because they have less 
incentive to carefully evaluate the credit quality of prospective borrowers. 
It is commonly accepted that most credit is nowadays created using the originate-to-
distribute model in which the originator of a loan sells it to someone (usually a special purpose 
entity), who adds it to a portfolio of similar loans, and then issues new securities, holding a 
claim against the income provided by the loan portfolio. The transition from the traditional 
originate-to-hold model to the originate-to-distribute model, as well as its reliance on credit 
markets as a continuing source of credit, has been blamed by academics and practitioners for the 
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financial crisis of 2007/2008. If the originator does not hold the credit it originates, but 
distributes the loan and its risks to other entities through securitization, the originator has a 
reduced incentive to monitor the credit granting process. Thus, this model brings with it a major 
principal-agent problem in the credit screening process, because the credit incentives of the 
originator are not aligned with those of the entity that ultimately holds the loan. When we add 
the growing complexity associated with the securitization process, the result is a ‘market for 
lemons’ problem [Akerlof (1970)], leading to the collapse of the market for securitized assets. 
However, it should be put into perspective that securitized subprime mortgage backed securities 
only represent 6% of the approximately (at the end of 2007) $10 trillion asset securitization 
market. Thus, the rest $9.4 trillion of structured products have generally been stable quality 
securities, with rating transition matrices probabilities equal to or better than the corporate bond 
market [Lancaster et al. (2008)]. 
In short, the crisis demonstrated that, in securitization, the value of the underlying cash 
flows varies with their repackaging, and that repackaging risk does not just eliminate it. 
Additionally, when market deterioration becomes systemic, SPVs may be unable to withstand 
market inertia, and triggers will eventually be breached – complex securitization products have 
introduced systemic risk into the financial system and maybe they have multiplied it. We can 
thus present some key factors that may help to overcome the shortcomings leading to the credit 
crisis, namely: (i) reduced complexity; (ii) increased transparency; (iii) increased 
standardization of transactions; (iv) improved disclosure of underwriting standards; (v) 
increasing the alignment of incentives between originators and investors; (vi) avoiding active 
rating shopping; (vii) reduced overreliance on credit ratings; (viii) increased risk management 
and risk mitigation; and (ix) the need for investors to understand the benefits and drawbacks of 
arbitrage mechanisms. 
7. Tax, Regulatory, Accounting, and Legal Issues 
The main tax issue in securitization is related to whether there will be taxation at the 
level of the vehicle company; i.e., will the payments of the borrowers be considered taxable 
income to the SPV? Because the sole purpose of the SPV is to buy and hold assets until they 
liquidate, SPVs have no outside sources of income. The introduction of an entity-level tax 
would render most securitizations uneconomic. Moreover, originators desire to treat 
securitization as a financing for tax purposes rather than as a sale. As pointed out by Davidson 
et al. (2003), “[S]ale treatment from a tax standpoint would generally accelerate taxable 
income. Issuers are also concerned that the securitization is tax effective and does not result in 
nondeductible interest costs or double taxation of residual income.” In a typical securitization, a 
trust is used to receive the pool of assets and issue securities backed by these assets, because it 
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allows to minimize the issuer’s tax burden and it also establishes a legal separation between the 
originator and the pool of assets deposited in the trust.
37
 
From a bank regulatory perspective, the originator is required, under new regulation 
from January 2011 onwards (Basel III), to retain at least 5% of the transaction for a funded 
transaction. In a synthetic transaction the originator would equally keep the first-loss piece, by 
transferring only the risk of higher tranches – via credit default swaps (CDS) or similar 
instruments – to investors. 
The key accounting issue is whether the securitization will be treated as a ‘true sale’ or a 
financing operation. Originators generally seek to record a securitization as a sale which 
requires immediate recognition of gain or loss on the transaction. Thus, based on the proceeds 
of the sale of the bonds and the value of retained interests, firms may record a gain (or loss) on 
sale when completing a securitization transaction. As pointed out by Roever and Fabozzi 
(2003), the principal “… among the accounting issues is whether the financing meets the 
requirements for off-balance-sheet treatment.” Usually, an asset transfer that is treated as a true 
sale for legal purposes qualifies as off-balance sheet financing if the SPV is a legally 
independent company from the seller. 
The fundamental legal issue in securitization is whether the vehicle company, created 
for the purpose of holding the collateral, has sufficient title to the assets and is protected from 
bankruptcy or other disruptions at the issuing [Rutledge and Raynes (2010)]. 
In summary, the key elements of any securitization transaction are legislation, 
regulatory framework, and tax environment; i.e., if an originator considers to securitize a 
portfolio of assets it has to be aware of applicable laws, security regulation, and tax regime that 
may impact on the transaction. This holds particularly true for a post-credit crisis market. The 
securitization market has seen considerable regulatory changes during and following the credit 
crisis, which are likely to continue until 2014/2015.
38
 
8. The Securitization Market 
8.1. Introduction 
According to Tasca and Zambelli (2005), “[T]he concept of asset securitization was 
introduced in the US financial system in the 1970s, when the Government National Mortgage 
Association issued securities backed by a pool of loans, represented by residential mortgages.” 
This is the major reason for the development of the strong U.S. housing finance market. 
                                                 
37
 See Davidson et al. (2003) for a more detailed description of issuing vehicles – e.g., grantor trusts, 
owner trusts, revolving trusts, master trusts, real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs), and 
financial asset securitization investment trusts (FASITs). 
38
 See Krebsz (2011) for further discussion of the legislative initiatives implemented in E.U. and U.S.; 
e.g., Basel III, EU Green Paper on Corporate Governance, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act – Asset-backed securities, and proposals to strengthen financial supervision in 
Europe. 
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Afterwards, securitization technique has been applied to other assets such as credit card 
payments and auto loans receivables. It has also been employed as part of asset/liability 
management, in order to manage balance sheet risk for financial institutions.  
The first European transaction was also a RMBS, issued in the U.K. in 1987. Around 
the early 1990s the first securitizations from other European countries have started. The first 
countries to join the U.K. in issuing ABS were Spain and France. These countries continued to 
be the main issuers until the mid-1990s, when Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, and Germany 
joined the growing list of countries using securitization. But it was in the second half of the 
1990s that securitization really began to take off as legislative changes in many countries began 
to simplify the process and to allow securitization to expand into new countries and asset 
classes. Finally, the introduction of the Euro in 1999 has significantly increased the importance 
of the European securitization market.
39
 Thus, till mid-2007 it has rapidly developed within U.S. 
and Europe. 
The diversity of the assets and the direct involvement of the public sector are 
characteristics differentiating the European market from the much larger and developed U.S. 
market. While, in U.S., the catalyst for securitization was the U.S. government’s objective for 
encouraging home ownership and creating a secondary market for mortgages, in Europe, there 
has been no government body to act as a catalyst. In most European countries, larger 
commercial banks have issued the first MBS with the objectives of regulatory arbitrage, 
diversification of funding sources, and as a response to the appeal of international investors. A 
number of governments started to use securitization as a means of reducing public budget 
deficits in order to meet the Maastricht criteria. Additionally, the lack of a large powerful body 
to provide for homogenization and standards and the differing legal frameworks on each 
European government provide a very different setting for securitization than in the United States 
– the wide divergence in market sizes within the European countries is a reflection of the very 
different economic, political, historical, legal, and social frameworks. 
In Europe, the legal setup of a deal is crucial, complicated, and is the main upfront cost 
for originators. In a securitization transaction in Europe, there are three important areas to think 
about with respect to legislation: (1) type of law – Napoleonic (e.g., Belgium, Spain, France, 
Luxemburg, and Portugal), Anglo-Saxon (e.g., United Kingdom), or Germanic (e.g., Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Austria, Netherlands, and Germany); (2) securing the assets and 
cash flows; and (3) local framework for securitization. That is why Adams (2005) asserts that 
“… although we may at times discuss the European securitization market as if it were a single 
market, it is in fact a collection of quite distinct markets, which differ considerably in their legal 
                                                 
39
 According to Altunbas et al. (2009), in addition to the inception of the single currency “… more 
regional factors such as the closer integration in European financial markets as well as a move towards a 
more market-based financial system…” can explain the escalation in securitization in Euro zone. 
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systems, the nature of their financial sectors, and social attributes. These differences are 
reflected in the variety of securitization structures and transactions types.” 
8.2. Securitization in Western Europe 
This section provides a statistical analysis of asset securitization (AS) in Western 
Europe.
40
 We start by comparing the distribution of AS bonds across time, industry, and 
nationality of the issuer. The financial characteristics of AS bonds are also presented. Finally, 
we compare our results for Western Europe with securitization activity in Europe and the U.S. 
Information on AS bonds was extracted from DCM Analytics database. DCM Analytics 
database (formerly Bondware database) is compiled by Dealogic and offers comprehensive 
information of debt securities issued on the debt capital markets. AS transactions typically 
consist of several tranches funding the same SPV. Therefore, we focus on the transaction 
tranches as our basic observation. Additionally, DCM Analytics only provide information about 
asset securitization securities issued in the capital markets through a public offering. 
The distribution by year of AS issues is described in Table 1. Table 2 presents the 
industrial distribution of AS issues, while Table 3 presents the geographic distribution of AS 
tranches.  
Table 1 shows the evolution of AS issues between 2000 and 2011. AS peaked in 2008 
(by value) and fell in 2009. After 2009, we do not have observations in our sample. This is 
partly explained by the European sovereign debt crisis, which has limited the increase of 
securitized products, but also by the fact that an increasing number of banks have underwritten 
their own securitization programs to use them as a guarantee for obtaining resources in the 
auctions of the European Central Bank (ECB), issuing the so-called Covered Bonds. According 
to Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010), this practice have partially replaced the issue of debt, or the 
interbank market itself, as sources of finance to enable banks to grant loans. 
 
                                                 
40
 We consider the following countries as pertaining to Western Europe: Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; 
Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Luxemburg; the Netherlands; 
Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; and the United Kingdom. 
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Number of Tranches
Total Value of Tranches 
(Euro Millions)
Percent of Total Value
2000 115 26,027 14.5
2001 81 12,990 7.3
2002 77 17,709 9.9
2003 42 14,894 8.3
2004 66 31,555 17.6
2005 53 10,034 5.6
2006 55 10,639 5.9
2007 35 3,469 1.9
2008 39 36,122 20.2
2009 36 15,694 8.8
2010 - - -
2011 - - -








Table 2 shows that AS bonds are highly concentrated in one industry; i.e., 75.1% of all 
AS bonds (by value) are issued by sponsors in the financial industry. Table 3 also shows clear 
differences between the Western European countries which attract AS transaction. AS bonds are 
highly concentrated in three countries (89.5% by value and 77% of the total number of issues 
are made by borrowers located in U.K., Germany, and Italy), with the bulk number of issues 
concentrated in the U.K. (41.2% by value and 48.7% of all AS tranches). 
 
Number of Tranches
Total Value of Tranches 
(Euro Millions)
Percent of Total Value
Commercial 90 21,750 12.1
Industrial 33 11,622 6.5
Utilities 27 8,522 4.8
Financial Institutions 444 134,457 75.1
Transportation 5 2,782 1.6
Government - - -
Other - - -





Table 2: Industrial distribution of AS issues. 
 
                                                 
41
 Table 1 describes the characteristics for the sample of bonds in the DCM Analytics database with the 
deal type code of “asset-backed security” and “mortgage-backed security”. The second column details the 
number of tranches issued between 2000 and 2011, while the third column describes the total value (in 
Euro millions). The fourth column presents percentages of the total value for each year. 
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Number of Tranches
Total Value of Tranches 
(Euro Millions)
Percent of Total Value
Austria 1 27 0.0
Belgium 18 1,723 1.0
Cyprus - - -
Denmark - - -
Finland - - -
France 32 1,526 0.9
Germany 117 47,299 26.4
Greece 2 74 0.0
Iceland - - -
Ireland 10 3,309 1.8
Italy 52 39,314 21.9
Luxemburg 3 173 0.1
Netherlands 42 4,270 2.4
Norway - - -
Portugal 11 1,391 0.8
Spain 19 6,228 3.5
Sweden - - -
Switzerland - - -
United Kingdom 292 73,797 41.2





Table 3: Geographic distribution of AS issues. 
 
Table 4 presents basic characteristics for the AS issues between 2000 and 2011. AS 
tranches have a mean value of 299 Euro millions, an average maturity 20.9 years and involve on 
average 2.4 banks per transaction. Further, 31.4% of AS transactions are exposed to currency 
risk. 
 
Variable of interest Asset Securitization Bonds
Number of tranches 599
Total volume, Euro millions 179,132




Average maturity, years 20.9
Tranches with guarantee (% ) 100.0
Tranches with currency risk (% ) 31.4
Tranches to U.K. borrowers (% ) 48.7
Tranches to financial institutions (% ) 74.1
Average number of banks 2.4  
Table 4: Basic characteristics for the sample of AS issues. 
 
The most remarkable finding is that AS bonds are always issued with guarantees. This 
largely meets the standard characteristics of securitization. Contrary to the traditional corporate 
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bonds, where it is the ability of the issuer to generate sufficient cash flows to repay the debt 
obligation that determines the risks of the transaction, in securitization the source of repayments 
shift from the cash flows of the issuer to the cash flows generated by the securitized assets 
and/or a third party guarantor, in case of default. 
Looking to the evolution of the structured finance markets, it is possible to conclude 
that securitization has become one of the most visible consequences of financial innovation in 
recent years. According to the Association for Financial Markets (AFM), the volume of 
securitized assets in Western Europe grew from 78.2 Euro billions in 2000 to 753.9 Euro 
billions in 2008. Although the 2007/2008 financial crisis, in which securitization seems to have 
played a determinant role, the pressing need for liquidity among financial entities provoked a 
sharp change after the first quarter of 2008. In 2013, a total of 166.7 Euro billions of securitized 
products were issued in Western Europe, a decline of 77.9% from 2008 (753.9 Euro billions). 
Table 5 compares the distribution by year of AS issues in Europe vis-a-vis the U.S. The 
AFM provides information about asset securitization securities issued in the capital markets 
through a public offering (such as DCM Analytics) or private placement. 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Austria 0.60 - - - - - - -
Belgium 2.30 4.00 34.87 27.43 14.13 19.02 15.41 2.00
Cyprus - - - - - - - -
Denmark - 0.50 - - 1.49 - - 0.80
Finland - - - - - - - -
France 7.70 3.90 14.09 6.93 8.98 16.35 14.86 9.90
Germany 37.70 18.50 110.61 18.36 13.39 12.91 10.03 22.60
Greece 3.60 5.30 13.47 22.48 0.96 6.37 1.97 -
Iceland - - - - - - - -
Ireland 10.70 10.40 35.97 25.13 6.55 - 1.22 1.00
Italy 30.20 26.40 94.82 69.25 15.97 48.08 58.44 27.40
Luxemburg - - - - - - - -
Netherlands 28.60 40.80 75.73 44.20 137.57 85.65 48.70 38.70
Norway - - - - - - - -
Portugal 5.80 10.80 14.52 10.50 16.93 9.91 1.42 3.30
Spain 44.00 61.10 103.40 64.88 54.92 61.72 18.63 27.50
Sweden 0.20 - - - - - - -
Switzerland - - - - - - - -
United Kingdom 192.20 172.60 256.39 88.66 101.52 99.52 76.50 33.50
Western Europe Total 363.60 354.30 753.87 377.82 372.41 359.53 247.18 166.70
PanEurope 1.70 2.10 12.42 20.32 2.60 3.04 0.41 9.10
Other Europe 1.90 1.10 12.91 1.82 1.63 3.38 2.95 4.70
Multinational 3.70 96.20 39.42 23.65 0.74 6.02 0.49 0.40
European Total 370.90 453.70 818.62 423.61 377.39 371.97 251.03 180.90
U.S. Total NA 2,404.90 933.63 1,358.90 1,276.69 1,013.72 1,550.18 1,508.87
Geographic 
Location of Issuer
Total Value (Euro Billions)
 
Table 5: Distribution of AS issues by year: Europe versus U.S.
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 Data according to the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, available at 
http://www.afme.eu/reports.aspx. 
 25 
MBS (RMBS and CMBS) continues to make up the majority of placed issuance in 
Europe (74.4 Euro billions in 2013), followed by ABS (71.6 Euro billions), SME loans (20.2 
Euro billions), CDO (9.2 Euro billions), and Whole Business Securitization (5.4 Euro billions). 
In Q4 2013, 56.3 Euro billions of securitized product was issued in Europe, an increase 
of 50.5% from Q3 2013 (37.4 Euro billions) but a decline of 11.9% from Q4 2012 (63.9 Euro 
billions). Of the 56.3 Euro billions issued, 21.6 Euro billions was placed, representing 38.4%, 
compared to 17.1 Euro billions placed in Q3 2013 (representing 45.7%) and 27.2 Euro billions 
placed in Q4 2012 (representing 42.5%). 
The volume of securitized assets in the U.S. declined from 2,404.9 Euro billions in 2007 
to 933.6 Euro billions in 2008, a decline of 61.2%. In 2013, a total of 1.508.9 Euro billions of 
securitized products were issued in the U.S., an increase of 61.6% from 2008. As for Europe, 
MBS (RMBS and CMBS) continues to make up the majority of placed issuance in the U.S. 
(1,310.6 Euro billions in 2013), followed by ABS (140.4 Euro billions), and CDOs (57.9 Euro 
billions). 
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 The difference between the values obtained from the AFM versus DCM Analytics database is due to 
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